Clouds generated in Kyoto

By F. James Sensenbrenner Copyright 1998 Washington Times December 15, 1998

Vice President Al Gore was conspicuously absent from the fourth round of global climate negotiations in Buenos Aires in November - and for good reason.

Perhaps Mr. Gore had a sneaking premonition that this year's global warming talks would prove detrimental to U.S. interests. If so, he was right. The administration made little diplomatic headway in Buenos Aires, but signed the Kyoto Protocol negotiated last year anyway.

U.S. delegation leader Stuart Eizenstat said he hoped the Buenos Aires talks would "create a process for installing the interior plumbing and circuitry to make Kyoto a reality." But from the very beginning, negotiations in Buenos Aires were fruitless, and sometimes chaotic, achieving little of the substance the White House wanted. For one, the White House failed to secure meaningful participation from developing nations, a crucial component needed for Senate ratification.

In fact, even discussing their participation was stricken from the agenda at the behest of developing country parties, led by China and India, some of the world's largest polluters.

So far, only two developing nations, Argentina and Kazakhstan, have agreed to voluntary restrictions on their emissions. The administration characterized their assent to the treaty as progress. But both countries make up less than 1 percent of total greenhouse gas emissions. And North Korea, China, India, Brazil and Mexico, among many others, remain adamantly opposed to meaningful commitments.

Secondly, the White House came away without an agreement on an international emissions trading mechanism, which, in theory, would partially ameliorate the economic consequences of complying with onerous emissions restrictions. The administration failed to forge a consensus on how such a trading mechanism would operate, which will mean at least a two-year delay in its definition. Moreover, negotiators discussed placing caps on the number of trading permits a country could buy, a position once hotly rejected by the administration. Yet the White House indicated in Buenos Aires that it might accept limitations on trading, even though such a policy would defeat its purpose. It's obvious that the White House was willing to accept any inroads against U.S. interests in order to save the treaty's fate.

With the hope of re-energizing the fruitless talks and saving face with environmentalists and the international community, the administration directed Acting U.N. Ambassador Peter Burleigh to sign the Kyoto Protocol in New York on Nov. 12. This decision, however, left mixed signals, and gave the U.S. imprimatur to a fatally flawed treaty that defies the Senate.

In an attempt to defray criticism for acceding to an unacceptable treaty, Mr. Eizenstat characterized the signing as "symbolic," and not legally binding in any way. Yet contrary to Mr. Eizenstat's assertions, signing the Protocol does matter. It indicates the United States "recognizes the authentic text, intends to complete the procedures for becoming legally bound by it, and is committed not to act against the treaty's objectives before being so bound."

In reality, signing the treaty was a snub to American families, who are concerned that a global climate treaty could affect their pocketbooks. And it was a desperate White House attempt to salvage future climate change negotiations and indicate to our international partners U.S. willingness to implement the Protocol despite vociferous opposition from the Senate.

Now, the White House is reluctant to submit a treaty to the Senate because it fails to meet the minimum criteria needed for ratification. According to the Byrd-Hagel resolution, which the Senate passed last year by a vote of 95 to 0, the United States should not be a signatory to any global warming protocol . . . unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties in the same compliance period."

Byrd-Hagel also directs against signing a global warming treaty that "results in serious harm to the economy of the United States." By signing the Protocol, the administration not only defied the Senate, but arrogantly dismissed concerns from the business community, the energy industry, and even analysts within its own ranks that burdensome emission caps could economically blight key energy-intensive industries and hurt American families.

One can assume that the White House will submit the Protocol to the Senate once international negotiations bear the results demanded in Byrd-Hagel. But those results may never come. If Buenos Aires is any guide, they probably never will. Thus, it is pivotal that the Kyoto Treaty be submitted in a timely manner to encourage discussion of what it entails now, not what it may entail in the future. The majority of the House Buenos Aires Delegation, which I led, has called on President Clinton to submit the treaty to the Senate when Congress reconvenes on Jan. 6, 1999. Failure to do so makes a mockery of the signing and diminishes U.S. credibility both at home and abroad.

Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., Wisconsin Republican, is chairman of the House Science Committee.

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